University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Occasional Papers

Law School Publications

1987

Reconsidering Miranda
Stephen J. Schulhofer

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/occasional_papers
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Schulhofer, "Reconsidering Miranda," University of Chicago Law Occasional Paper, No. 23 (1987).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Occasional Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Occasional Papers from
The Law School
The University of Chicago

Number 23

Reconsidering Miranda
Stephen J. Schulhofer

I

Occasional Papers from
The Law School
The University of Chicago

Number 23

Reconsidering Miranda
Stephen J. Schulhofer

Copies of Occasional Papers from the Law School
are available from William S. Hein & Company, Inc.,
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209, to
whom inquiries should be addressed. Current numbers are also available on subscription from William
S. Hein & Company, Inc.

Reconsidering Miranda
Stephen J. Schulhofer*
Few decisions of the Warren Court have attracted as
much attention and controversy as its 1966 ruling in
Miranda v. Arizona.' Miranda relied upon the fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination to impose limits on custodial police
interrogation. The Court was vilified for "handcuffing the police" and for "favoring the criminal forces
over the peace forces." Recently Miranda has
become the focus of renewed debate. The Department of Justice, in a 120-page report endorsed by
Attorney General Edwin Meese III, attacks the
Miranda decision as an illegitimate act of judicial
2
policy-making that the Court should now overrule.
It is not inherently improper, of course, for a public official to urge legal positions different from those
accepted by the Supreme Court. But in order to do so
he should have some good reasons. In this case the
report's objections to the legal basis for Miranda are
misdirected, and its claims about Miranda's harmful
effects on law enforcement prove surprisingly thin.
Talk about "overruling" Miranda usually obscures
the fact that Miranda contains not one holding but a
complex series of holdings. They can be subdivided
in various ways, but three conceptually distinct steps
were involved in the Court's decision. First, the
Court held that informal pressure to speak-that is,
pressure not backed by legal process or any formal
sanction-can constitute "compulsion" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Second, it held that
this element of informal compulsion is present in any
questioning of a suspect in custody, no matter how
short the period of questioning may be. Third, the
*Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law and Director
of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School. This essay is based on a paper delivered on February 12, 1987, in Nashville Tennessee, at a conference on "The
Fifth Amendment and Original Intent," sponsored by the Center
for Judicial Studies. It was subsequently published in 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 435 (1987). This reprinting omits small sections of text
and almost half the footnotes. The ommissions are not indicated.
The essay is reprinted with permission. @ 1987 by The University
of Chicago.
I 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to
the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-trial Interrogation (Feb.
12, 1986, with addendum of Jan. 20, 1987) ("DOJ Report").
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Court held that precisely specified warnings are
required to dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation. The third step, the series of particularized warnings, raises the concerns about
judicial legislation that usually preoccupy Miranda's
critics. But the core of Miranda is located in the first
two steps. To assess the soundness of the Justice
Department's case, we need to begin by considering
these first two holdings in depth.
I.

INFORMAL COMPULSION

The Court's first holding was that compulsion, within
the meaning of the fifth amendment, can include
informal pressure to speak. Note first that there is not
the slightest doubt about the legitimacy of settling
this question by adjudication. The fifth amendment
says that no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself. According to one view, this
word referred only to formal legal compulsion. But it
is a normal act of interpretation for a court to consider whether "compulsion" was intended to cover
informal pressures as well.
A more important problem is to determine whether
the Court's decision on this point was correct on the
merits. In Bram v. United States, decided in 1897, the
Court had relied on the fifth amendment to suppress
a statement made during a brief custodial interrogation, but Bram was promptly forgotten, and for the
next sixty years the Court consistently held that the
fifth amendment privilege was inapplicable to police
interrogation. Because the suspect had no legal obligation to speak, the argument ran, there was no compulsion in the fifth amendment sense. Under the due
process clause, which was conceived as a different
and more flexible standard, confessions were held
inadmissible only when involuntary, and this "voluntariness" requirement was violated only when police
employed tactics that were sufficiently extreme to
"break the will" of the suspect.
In 1936, in its first confessions ruling in a state
case, the Court held inadmissible a statement
obtained by beating the suspect with a leather strap.
Subsequent decisions restricted interrogation techniques, but gradually and only partially. Physical
violence was ruled out, but psychological pressure
was not. Although decisions throughout the 1950s
and early 1960s seemed to reduce the degree of permissible pressure, the admissibility of a confession
still turned only on whether, under all the circum4

stances, the suspect's will had been "overborne."
Marathon, all-night interrogation sessions, persistent cross-questioning, and use of numerous interrogators in relays were permissible under some
circumstances.
Any witness who has faced thirty minutes of crossexamination by an aggressive defense attorney can
easily imagine the pressures that were brought to
bear and the potential for confusion and mistake that
arose when a suspect without counsel was questioned
for hours on end in the secrecy of the police station.
Members of the Court began to recognize that
interrogation of an isolated suspect in custody was
difficult to reconcile with the fifth amendment. At
trial, at legislative hearings, and at any other formal
proceeding, the criminal suspect had a constitutional
right to remain silent. Even under the watchful eye of
a judge, with his own attorney at his side, the suspect
could not be pressured to speak. Many members of
the Court found it difficult to justify a constitutional
interpretation that permitted pressuring the uncounseled suspect to submit to questioning in the isolated
environment of the stationhouse.3
In holding the fifth amendment applicable to informal compulsion, Miranda rejected a long line of
precedent. Nonetheless, this step in the Miranda
analysis was not at odds with the original understanding of the fifth amendment. The early history of the
privilege is clouded and ambiguous, but it seems
clear that the privilege was intended to bar pretrial
examination by magistrates, the only form of pretrial
interrogation known at the time. The reasons for concern about that form of interrogation under formal
process apply with even greater force to questioning
under compelling informal pressures. As Professor
Edmund Morgan showed almost forty years ago:
The function which the police have assumed in
interrogating an accused is exactly that of the
early committing magistrates, and the opportunities for imposition and abuse are fraught with
much greater danger.... Investigation by the
police is not judicial, but when it consists of an
examination of the accused, it is quite as much an
official proceeding as the early English preliminary examination before a magistrate, and it has
3 The classic discussion of this problem is found in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure, reprinted in Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions 27-40 (1980).
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none of the safeguards of a judicial proceeding. 4
Although Morgan's view was not accepted by all
leading experts on the law of evidence, the great
majority concurred in his assessment. Indeed, the
Justice Department, true to its originalist premises,
concedes that the self-incrimination clause applies to
the informal pressures of custodial interrogation.
Not only do policy and history suggest the implausibility of restricting the fifth amendment's protection to purely formal pressures, but the principles
applied in contexts other than police interrogation
make clear that no tenable line can be drawn between
formal and informal compulsion. In fact, Miranda's
first holding was strongly foreshadowed by Griffin v.
California,5 in which the Court held that prosecutorial comment upon a defendant's failure to testify at
trial violated the privilege by making its assertion
costly. The compulsion in Griffin did not flow from
formal process or any legal obligation to speak. The
problem was that the prosecutor's comment increased
(indirectly) the chances of conviction. To be sure, the
trial court lent its approval (indirectly) to that consequence, by declining to bar this kind of jury argument. But what mattered in Griffin were the real
world consequences of the prosecutorial behavior,
not whether the state had brought to bear any formal
process or official sanction. If a requirement of formal compulsion remained at all after Griffin, it
surely had been stretched paper-thin.
Developments subsequent to Griffin have confirmed this evolution and made clear that compulsion
can no longer be limited to the pressure of formal
sanctions. Building on Griffin's holding that the prosecution cannot comment on a defendant's silence at
trial, the Court recently held that even in the absence
of such comment, the judge must instruct the jury not
to draw adverse inferences from silence; in effect,
"compulsion" arises from the state's failure to take
reasonable steps to eliminate pressure that is wholly
informal and psychological. 6 Similarly, in an extension of decisions that bar the state from firing an
employee who refuses to waive his fifth amendment
privilege, the Court recently reasoned that to assess
compulsion, "we must take into account potential
economic benefits realistically likely of attainment.
4 Edmund Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 27,28 (1949).
5 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
6 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
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Prudent persons weigh heavily such legally unenforceable prospects in making decisions; to that
extent, removal of those prospects constitutes economic coercion." 7
Against this background, the pre-Miranda claim
that the fifth amendment had no application to informal pressure seems an historical curiosity. Although
Miranda'srejection of this claim overruled numerous
precedents, that step in its analysis no longer seems
open to serious question.
II.

INTERROGATION AS COMPULSION

Miranda'ssecond major step was the holding that any
custodial interrogation involves enough pressure to
constitute "compulsion" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment. Again, notice that there is no doubt
about the legitimacy of settling this issue by judicial
decision. The question of what pressures constitute
"compulsion" unavoidably confronts the Court in
cases involving loss of a job, a comment on silence,
or the menacing look of a person in authority. There
is nothing improper or even unusual about deciding
such questions in the course of adjudication.
On the merits, is the Court's second holding
sound? This issue is much more problematic than the
first. One difficulty arises from the emphatically per
se character of the Court's holding. But before
addressing this problem, we must be clear about
the standard that would apply, in the absence of a
per se rule, to determine when interrogation is
"compelling."
A. Confusion About Compulsion
The fifth amendment was no doubt intended to prohibit Star Chamber inquisition tactics such as the
rack and the thumbscrew. But brutal torture is not the
only method of interrogation that the amendment
prohibits. Fifth amendment compulsion perhaps can
be identified more naturally with the requirement of
voluntariness under the due process clause. Under
this approach, a person is "compelled" for fifth
amendment purposes when his will is overborne by
pressure, whether physical or psychological. This
conception of the fifth amendment test appears to be
common, and it has been reinforced by loose language in numerous decisions. Miranda (and Brarn
7 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807 (1977) (Burger)
(emphasis added).
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before it) treated fifth amendment protection as distinct from the voluntariness requirement, but then
drew on voluntariness concepts to explain "compulsion." Other Warren era decisions expanding fifth
amendment protection again seemed to conflate the
two concepts, even when no reading of the confession
cases decided under the voluntariness concept could
support the broad notion of "compulsion" that the
Court applied. More recently, the Court has made
explicit the connection between compulsion and the
due process standard. In Oregon v. Elstad, for example, the Court said that an actual violation of the fifth
amendment (as distinguished from a mere presumption of compulsion) occurs only when there is "physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to
break the suspect's will. "8
If this is what fifth amendment compulsion
requires, then Miranda's second step involved a
seemingly superfluous change in the wording of the
governing test, followed by a glaring non sequitur in
the application of that test to the facts. The Court
replaced involuntariness (the due process touchstone) with compulsion (an identically defined fifth
amendment criterion) but then found compulsion in
circumstances that countless decisions had found
consistent with voluntariness, circumstances that no
stretch of the imagination could view as breaking the
suspect's will. Thus, if compulsion is properly
equated with the due process prohibition against
breaking the will, Miranda'ssecond holding not only
departs from precedent but appears unjustified and
even incomprehensible in terms of the applicable
constitutional standard.
The Justice Department report develops this theme
and takes it to its logical conclusion. If a departure
from Miranda's requirements does not necessarily
violate the Constitution, where does the Court get its
authority to reverse the conviction? Taking literally
the Court's recent comments that distinguish between
Miranda violations and constitutional violations, the
report argues that Miranda itself must be wrong.
The original Miranda decision did not proceed on
this basis, of course. The majority opinion and the
dissents all reflect an understanding that voluntariness and fifth amendment compulsion are distinct
concepts. Indeed, the point had been underscored at
oral argument:
8 470 U.S.
8

298, 312 (1985) (emphasis added).

Mr. Justice Harlan: Is there a claim that the confession was coerced?
Mr. [Victor M.] Earle, [III] [counsel for petitioner in the companion case of Vignera v. New
York]: In no sense. I don't think it was coerced at
all. Mr. Justice White asked yesterday a question
about compelling someone to give up his Fifth
Amendment privilege. I think there is a substantial difference between that and coercing a confession.... It is true that the word "compel" is used
in the Fifth Amendment with respect to the privilege, but it is quite different to say that the privilege is cut down and impaired by detention and to
say a man's will has been so overborne a confession is forced from him. 9
Despite the concession that Vignera's confession
was not coerced, the Court reversed Vignera's conviction and stated explicitly that custodial interrogation was "compelling" within the meaning of the
self-incrimination clause even when it did not render
a statement "involuntary." 0 The Court's recent comments assuming that a fifth amendment violation
requires overbearing the will thus appear to disregard
(or to overrule without discussion) the core of what
Miranda decided.
Of course, debate about the meaning of compulsion cannot be settled simply by resort to stare
decisis. Though Miranda'sconclusion, which distinguished involuntariness from compulsion, was clear
enough at the time, many have not understood how
the Court could support its position. If a compelled
statement means an involuntary one, indeed if-as
able writers suggest-it can mean nothing else, then
Miranda'ssecond holding is fragile indeed.
The decisive question is whether fifth amendment
compulsion should be equated with the due process
rule against the use of "deliberate means to break the
suspect's will." It is readily understandable that
terms so similar in ordinary usage, "involuntary"
and "compelled," can get confused with one
another, even by lawyers. Nonetheless, this concept
of compulsion involves a fundamental misunderstanding of uncontroversial fifth amendment principles and, if taken seriously, would make nonsense of
the privilege against self-incrimination.
9 Oral Arguments in Miranda and Companion Cases, excerpted
in Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 537, 540 (6th ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
10Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
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Consider, for example, the principle that a threat to
discharge a public employee will render any resulting
statement "compelled." No one would suggest that
the threat "breaks the will" of the employee; he simply faces the unpleasant choice between silence and
his job. Similarly, a comment on the defendant's
silence at trial is impermissible because it makes
exercise of the privilege costly; no one could suggest
that the prospect of this disadvantage breaks the
defendant's will. One might reconcile compulsion
principles with the voluntariness standard by suggesting that language about "breaking the will"
should not be taken literally, that due process prohibits even mild pressures that are perceived as unfair.
Miranda's critics cannot take this route, however,
because mild interrogation pressures could then render a confession "involuntary."And no one trying to
make sense of the law can take this route either,
because it dilutes the voluntariness concept beyond
recognition; a voluminous contemporary case law
continues to find extended interrogation compatible
with voluntariness in the due process sense.
There is an alternative route for reconciling current
doctrine with the assumption that compulsion means
involuntariness. Insisting that compulsion means
overbearingpressure, one could question Griffin and
the employment discharge cases. Indeed, if "breaking the will" or some similarly stringent test governs,
then these decisions are wrong, and the Court must
be prepared to overrule them. But apart from the fact
that the Court has shown no inclination to do so, this
way of thinking about "compulsion" cannot carry us
very far. Consider a contempt statute subjecting a
defendant to a fine or six months' imprisonment for
refusal to testify. If the fifth amendment means anything, it means that a witness claiming a potential for
self-incrimination cannot be punished under such a
statute; modest fines and brief imprisonment constitute compulsion. Even a $100 fine for silence is
improper. Yet no one would suggest that such a penalty "breaks the will," and without violating due
process we regularly impose more severe sanctions
upon recalcitrant witnesses not in a position to claim
the privilege.
One may be tempted to say that imposing a direct
penalty is especially offensive or unfair. But why? If
we have to reinvent the distinction between formal
and informal pressure, we are not on very attractive
ground. Nor can we find refuge in the principle that
bars punishment for the exercise of constitutional
10

rights. If the fifth amendment grants only a right not
to be "compelled" and if compulsion means overbearing the will, then the witness has no privilege to
keep both his silence and his $100 in the first place.
The upshot is that compulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for due process
purposes cannot mean the same thing. Much as one
would like to resist the proliferation of terms, any
attempt to get by with one concept, combining compulsion and involuntariness, creates more problems
than it solves.
The need for distinct concepts of "involuntariness"
and "compulsion" is confirmed by the law of waiver.
When Miranda's critics assume that self-incrimination and due process protections must be the same,
they find waiver a mystery. Why would any sane person waive his right to be free of torture, physical
abuse, or psychological pressure that breaks the will?
Yet countless cases purport to deal with waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege, in the interrogation context and elsewhere. Such waivers are not legally
inconsequential, but neither do they give a green
light for "breaking the will."
At trial, any penalty imposed on a witness for
refusal to testify constitutes "compulsion" and is
impermissible if there is potential self-incrimination.
But once the witness freely chooses to testify, the
state can subject the witness to "compulsion." This
does not mean that the witness can be tortured, nor
can he be subjected to thirty-six hours of continuous
cross-examination by teams of attorneys in relay.
Under no circumstances, with or without waiver, can
the state break the witness's will. What waiver means
is that the state can subject the witness to the more
civilized but nonetheless "compelling" pressures
that are prohibited only by the self-incrimination
clause. Cross-examination is permissible (during
business hours, with reasonable breaks, and with a
defense attorney nearby), trick questions can be used
to get at the facts, and if the witness balks, the state
can deploy sanctions for the specific purpose of pressuring the witness to tell the truth. After waiver
the state can "compel" answers, but it can never do
so by overbearing tactics that render the answers
"involuntary."
These examples make clear that fifth amendment
compulsion cannot be identified with involuntariness
and is never limited to breaking the will. At the other
extreme, compulsion cannot be satisfied by any
inconvenience resulting from failure to testify. Insist11

ing on the latter point, opponents of Miranda argue
that compulsion is a matter of degree and that the
Court necessarily has discretion in determining how
much pressure to permit. It follows, they suggest,
that the line drawn by Miranda was no more logical
than that drawn by the voluntariness cases and that
law enforcement needs can be weighed in striking the
constitutional "balance." But this kind of argument
assumes that standards for compulsion in police
interrogation can be independent of the benchmarks
used to resolve this issue in other fifth amendment
contexts. In self-incrimination analysis, the threshold
of permissible pressure is low, and more important,
the amount of pressure is less significant than the
reason why pressures arise. Disabilities or pressures
that have the effect of discouraging silence but are not
created for that reason normally are permissible. But
pressure imposed for the purpose of discouraging the
silence of a criminal suspect constitutes prohibited
compulsion whether or not it "breaks the will." This
is the clear teaching of the fifth amendment's core
applications to compulsion by legal process. The policy served by the amendment is not limited to preventing inhuman degradation or breaking the will,
but extends to all governmental efforts intended to
pressure an unwilling individual to assist as a witness
in his own prosecution.I
From this perspective, Miranda is not in conflict
with the numerous voluntariness cases decided
before 1966. Miranda overruled the implicit holding
of these cases that the fifth amendment was inapplicable to informal compulsion, but on the question of
which informal pressures constituted compulsion,
these cases were silent. In holding that police had not
"broken the will" of various suspects, these cases
had not found an absence of state-created pressures to
speak. Indeed, it was evident in every one of the
II Without violating the fifth amendment, the government may
pressure witnesses to provide testimony or other information, and
the burden is on the individual who fears self-incrimination to
claim the privilege. So long as the claim of privilege is available,
the governmental pressure compels answers but does not compel
self-incrimination. But the individual's obligation affirmatively to
claim the privilege does not apply when governmental inquiries
are addressed to those inherently suspect of criminal activities.
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 652 n.7, 657, 660 (1976).
In custodial interrogation, for example, "the inquiring government is acutely aware of the potentially incriminating nature of the
disclosures sought. Thus, any pressures inherent in custodial
interrogation are compulsions to incriminate, not merely compulsions to make unprivileged disclosures." Id. at 657.
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voluntariness cases that police had employed significant pressure for the purpose of getting recalcitrant
suspects to talk. Under the due process approach,
such pressures were permissible if not so extreme as
to "shock the conscience." Even express promises of
benefit, designed to overcome silence, had been
allowed when they did not break the suspect's will.
The one pre-Miranda precedent that is relevant to
determining the degree of interrogation pressure permissible for fifth amendment purposes is Bram.
There, in the course of a brief interview the interrogator had suggested, "If you had an accomplice, you
should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible
crime on your own shoulders." 2 The Court found
this statement sufficient by itself to establish a fifth
amendment violation. The Court held that the statement "might well have been understood as holding
out an encouragement that by [naming an accomplice] he might at least obtain a mitigation of the punishment for the crime.... '[T]he law cannot measure
the force of the influence used or decide upon its
effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and, therefore,
excludes the declaration if any degree of influence
has been exerted. "13
It is this standard, never considered controversial
when applied to judicial proceedings, that underlies
Miranda's second holding. Custodial interrogation
brings psychological pressure to bear for the specific
purpose of overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to
talk, and it is therefore inherently compelling within
the meaning of the fifth amendment.
B.

The Conclusive Presumption of Compulsion

Even if the Miranda decision is supportable so far,
difficulty arises from the per se character of the
Court's holding. The Court found compulsion in a
police officer's very first question. Defenders of
Miranda would note that even one question can be
compelling under some circumstances. The response
of a naive young suspect, following just a few seconds of interrogation, can plausibly be seen as compelled by fear of mistreatment, by expectations of
unrelenting interrogation, or more simply by the
utterly natural assumption that he is obliged to
answer-that when a person in authority asks a question, the official is legally entitled to a response.
12 Bram,

168 U.S. at 539.
at 565 (emphasis added), quoting William 0. Russell,
Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 479 (6th ed. 1896).

13Id.
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But an argument of this kind cannot support Miranda's crucial second step. The Court did not hold that
a brief period of interrogation can involve compulsion. The Court held that the briefest period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion. To test
this conclusion, we must consider whether a defendant's first answer always will be compelled.
In thinking realistically about this issue, one must
recognize that even the sophisticated, knowledgeable
suspect faces considerable state-created pressure to
talk. The sophisticated suspect, precisely because he
knows the law, will be aware that under the due process approach, the police can subject him to extended
periods of interrogation, day and night. He will also
know that if he does not talk, his silence can count
against him. In fact, even after Miranda, it remains
true that post-arrest silence can be used for impeachment purposes if the detained suspect has not
received warnings. A sophisticated suspect would
know that refusal to respond to questions would subject him to a penalty in the event of trial, and preMiranda interrogators were trained to get this point
across to any suspect sufficiently knowledgeable to
attempt to invoke his rights.14
Beyond these problems lies a more basic difficulty.
Even if our sophisticated suspect knows his rights
and their ramifications, he needs to know whether
the police know his rights. And he needs to know
whether the police are prepared to respect those
rights. If our sophisticated suspect knows anything
about the law in action, he will know that custodial
interrogation occurs outside the view of any disinterested observer. He will know that for perfectly
understandable reasons, conscientious officers,
intent on solving brutal crimes, sometimes lose their
tempers and that instances of physical abuse, though
not the norm, often surface in case reports and in the
newspapers.' 5 Even the sophisticated law professor
or professional investigator, if he found himself sus14 Prior to Miranda, a well-known manual for police interrogators advised the following response to the suspect who invoked his
right to silence: "Joe, you have the right to remain silent. That's
your privilege.... But let me ask you this. Suppose you were in my
shoes and I were in yours... and I told you, 'I don't want to answer
any of your questions.' You'd think I had something to hide." Fred
E. Inbau and John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 111(1962).
15 Examples continued to surface in the 1970s and 1980s. See,
e.g., the series, The Confession Takers, Newsday (Dec.7-19,
1986), and the reported decisions collected in Welsh S. White,
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pected of crime, would be under considerable pressure to cooperate with the police, to try to get them
on his side by telling what he knew or what he
thought he could safely disclose, rather than standing
confidently on his right to remain silent. So it is by no
means implausible for the Court to have said that any
custodial questioning, even for a few seconds, is
inherently compelling.
One might argue, however, that my examples do
not go far enough, because they still depend on introducing elements of fear and anxiety. What justification is there for holding that such elements
necessarily must be present in every custodial interrogation? Surely one can imagine a case in which a
law professor-suspect knows his rights and is not in
fear of abuses, in which he tells all in response to the
first question, not because of any sense of pressure
but simply because he wants the truth to come out.
Because such a case is conceivable, and because the
Court's per se rule would find a fifth amendment violation even in that case, some critics conclude that
Miranda's second holding is itself prophylactic, that
the Court did not simply interpret the meaning of
compulsion but rather replaced the no-compulsion
rule with a much broader prohibition.
In evaluating this challenge to the use of conclusive
presumptions and related forms of prophylactic
rules, we must remember first that these aids to adjudication are a pervasive feature of judicial decision
making. In antitrust law, the courts conclusively presume that certain kinds of agreements constitute
unreasonable restraints of trade. In constitutional
law, prophylactic rules conclusively presume
abridgement of freedom of speech from the mere
possibility that certain kinds of statutes will deter the
exercise of first amendment rights. The required separation of church and state is violated in some contexts by the mere risk that state-sponsored programs
can be used for religious indoctrination, even when
Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 Vand. L.
Rev. 1, 13-14 & n.73 (1986). The cases collected by White
included such tactics as choking the suspect, twisting an arm
behind his back, and threatening him with death (Florida 1982);
striking the suspect's pregnant wife in the stomach and preventing
her from receiving medical attention until the suspect confessed
(Louisiana 1984); twenty-six hours of continuous interrogation
(Connecticut 1973); interrogating the suspect while he was naked
and encouraging him to consume large quantities of alcohol
(Maine 1983); threatening to imprison the suspect's wife and place
his children in foster care (West Virginia 1981).
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undisputed evidence makes clear that the risk has not
materialized. The Court has held, in a ruling rarely if
ever questioned by critics of Miranda, that an indigent's need for appointed counsel in a felony prosecution will be conclusively presumed, regardless of
evidence about his maturity, background, and education.' 6 Similarly, under the voluntariness test preferred by critics of Miranda, the Court held as early
as 1944 that a few extreme forms of police pressure
would trigger a conclusive presumption of involuntariness, regardless of evidence of the suspect's maturity, stamina, or physical condition.
In recent years the Supreme Court has tended to
prefer constitutional tests that turn on all the circumstances. But the Court has not only reaffirmed the
kinds of prophylactic rules just mentioned, but also,
in response to its own perceptions of the problems of
adjudication, the Court has created new presumptions that amount to reverse prophylactic rules. The
Court has ruled, for example, that a police officer's
search of the rear seat of a car, incident to the arrest
of an occupant, will be conclusively presumed reasonable, regardless of evidence that the particular
suspect may have been handcuffed or far removed
from the car, and regardless of evidence about
whether any other legitimate basis to search was
actually present.
Neither the pervasiveness of prophylactic rules nor
their proliferation under both "liberal" and "conservative" Courts necessarily proves that such rules are
legitimate. But one can see that the Court would face
enormous adjudicatory burdens if resort to conclusive presumptions was never permissible. Ashcraft v.
Tennessee" makes clear the dilemma. In that case the
Court ruled that thirty-six hours of continuous interrogation was "inherently coercive." Writing for the
three dissenters, Justice Jackson passionately protested the Court's refusal to consider all the circumstances and its reliance upon an "irrebuttable
presumption." The goal, Jackson implied, should
not be rulemaking but only the most accurate resolution of the case sub judice.
All agree that a court's responsibility for accurate
factfinding allows it to assign burdens of proof and to
adopt rebuttable presumptions. Miranda's critics,
echoing Justice Jackson, argue that a conclusive presumption is qualitatively different. But in appropri16Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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ate circumstances, the same logic applies to both
kinds of presumptions. When an assessment is complex and often beyond the ken of judges (as in the
antitrust area) or when proof of the circumstances
crucial to a fact-bound judgment is largely within the
control of one party (as in Ashcraft), a conclusive
presumption may be the best way, over the run of
cases, to minimize adjudicatory error. Consider the
alternative. Should police be allowed to give the prisoner a few punches or kicks, so long as the force used
does not (under all the circumstances) overbear his
will? One slap would intimidate most of us, but what
about the professional gangster or the hardened contract liller? In the heyday of the "totality" test, the
Court insisted upon weighing all the circumstances in
such 2ases, and it once held voluntary a confession
obtained after police had kicked the suspect in the
shins." But in subsequent cases all the justices,
including Jackson, agreed that even the voluntariness
test had to include prophylactic rules: a single blow
would render a confession involuntary per se.' 9 Of
course, one must look closely at prophylactic rules to
see whether they are appropriate for the context in
which the Court has applied them. But there is nothing inherently improper or illegitimate about a rule
just because it embodies a conclusive presumption.
Against this background, we can return to Miranda's holding that any custodial interrogation is inherently compelling. The proper question is whether an
irrebuttable presumption is an appropriate adjudicatory tool in this particular context. This is a question
with a history, and the Miranda Court came to it after
decades of experience with case-by-case assessment
of all the circumstances. Whatever logic may have
suggested about the rigidity of conclusive presumptions, experience had shown that the flexible due process test created numerous problems, not only for
suspects facing interrogation, but also for the. courts
and the police.2 0 Although the shift from due process
to the fifth amendment approach reduced the permissible degree of pressure and ostensibly eliminated the
basis for "balancing" the need for a confession
ISStroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).

19Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (Jackson). See
also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957) (Frankfurter and
Brennan, concurring).
20 For discussion, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and
the Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 867-78 (1981); Kamisar, Police
Interrogation at 1-25, 69-76 (cited in note 3).
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against the suspect's right to silence, other difficulties of the due process approach remained. The flexible test had left lower courts without usable standards
and thus had created disproportionate demands for
case-by-case review in the federal courts. The problems of judicial review also meant that intense interrogation pressures were inadequately controlled in
practice. The case-by-case approach even failed to
prevent, and in subtle ways actually encouraged, outright physical brutality. As Dean Wigmore noted,
"The exercise of the power to extract answers begets
a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power.
The simple and peaceful process of questioning
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture." 2 1 Finally, case-by-case review
left police themselves without adequate guidance.
Faced with a reticent suspect who might be starting
to "crack," were the police supposed to give him
some rest or to keep up the pressure? The due process approach in effect told police to do both.
To put these problems in perspective, we must consider how often, after meticulous evaluation of the
circumstances, a genuine absence of compulsion can
be found. Police interviews are tension-filled matters
under the best of circumstances. Interviews in the
absence of counsel, in the police-dominated custodial environment, are filled with tension in spades.
And the tensions are created for the very purpose of
overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk. Professor Joseph Grano, a leading critic of Miranda,
recognizes as much:
[D]istinctions can be made in terms of perceived
offensiveness among tactics designed to increase
the suspect's anxiety. The point remains, however,
that all such tactics, whether or not "offensive, "
are intended to increase the pressure-the compulsion-on the suspect to confess. The "inherent
compulsion" of custodial interrogation would be
present if an untrained, uniformed officer questioned the suspect in the stationhouse receiving
room.22
The Justice Department report, in referring to
Miranda's holding that interrogation is inherently
compelling, repeatedly characterizes this conclusion
as a "fiction." One must wonder which view is furJohn H. Wigmore, 8 Evidence at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
22 Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 662, 674 (1986) (emphasis added).
21
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ther from reality. Justice Jackson, an ardent proponent of extended interrogation, saw the point clearly:
"To speak of any confessions of crime made after
arrest as being 'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional." 23 Professor
Gerald Caplan, a prominent contemporary critic of
Miranda, concedes that "[in ordinary discourse,
voluntariness suggests free will, choice, even spontaneity. In the typical interrogation, however, there is
some coercion; the suspect is detained, queried,
challenged, and contradicted." 24 The Justice Department's notion that an isolated, unwarned suspect facing custodial interrogation is not typically under
great state-created pressure to talk is itself the flimsiest of fictions.
Is it clear that such pressure is sufficient to cross
the constitutional threshold of compulsion? Once
again, Griffin v. Californiais suggestive. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Griffin, complained that the Court
had "stretche[d] the concept of compulsion beyond
all reasonable bounds." 25 A few critical commentators agree. But Griffin, decided over only two dissents, remains good law and has been reaffirmed and
extended by lopsided majorities in the Burger Court.
If a comment on silence generates impermissible
pressure to speak at a trial (where the comment adds
only marginally to inferences the jury will draw anyway), can we say that a police officer's request for
information, addressed to an unwarned suspect in
custody, does not create impermissible pressure?
Because an adverse inference from silence is also a
prospect when the suspect refuses the officer's
request, a finding of compulsion here follows a fortiori as long as Griffin remains on the books.
Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that
the Court, exasperated after years of case-by-case
adjudication, finally adopted a prophylactic rule? A
conclusive presumption of compulsion is in fact a
responsible reaction to the problems of the voluntariness test, to the rarity of cases in which compelling
pressures are truly absent, and to the adjudicatory
costs of case-by-case decisions in this area. Indeed,
in any ranking of the issues that properly demand
some form of prophylactic rule, the problem of determining compulsion in the context of custodial interAshcraft, 322 U.S. at 161 (dissenting opinion).
Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 Vand. L. Rev.
1417, 1430 (1985).
25 380 IJ.S. at 620.
23
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rogation wins the prize hands down.
To summarize, then, one has to say that Miranda's
second step, like its first, not only was an unquestionably legitimate act of adjudication, but also was, on
the merits, a sound and entirely justified interpretation of the fifth amendment. Indeed, the Court cannot overrule Miranda's first or second holdings
without tearing a wide hole in the fabric of fifth
amendment doctrine and dismantling the foundations
of numerous uncontroversial precedents outside the
area of police interrogation.
III.

THE WARNINGS

This brings us to Miranda's third step, its wellknown panoply of "code-like rules," 26 requiring that
the suspect receive a complex, four-part warning of
his rights. Here the complaints about judicial legislation seem at first glance to have some substance. But
in weighing the force of those complaints, we should
focus carefully on the effect of Miranda's detailed
rules. Do the warnings "handcuff" the police? We
can now see that their function is precisely the opposite. If the Court was correct in the first two steps of
its analysis, and I submit that it was, then far from
handcuffing the police, the warnings work to liberate
the police. Miranda's much-maligned rules permit the officer to continue questioning his isolated
suspect, the very process that the Court's first
two holdings found to be a violation of the fifth
amendment.
The Court's theory with respect to the warnings
was that they could "dispel" the inherently compelling atmosphere of police interrogation. But there is
great room for doubt about that theory. Indeed, the
Miranda opinion itself suggests that such a theory is
not especially realistic:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the
will of one merely made aware of his privilege by
his interrogators.... A once-stated warning,
delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to [assure an unfettered
choice between silence and speech] among those
who most require knowledge of their rights....
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by
his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the
26 Edwin Meese III, Square Miranda Rights With Reason, Wall
St. J. 22 (June 13, 1986).
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secret interrogation process.27
The notion that police-initiated warnings can "dispel" the compulsion thus seems dubious at best. But
whether or not they went far enough, Miranda's
warnings unquestionably serve-and from the outset
were designed to serve-the function of permitting
custodial interrogation to continue. Indeed, the
Court would have incurred far more police criticism
if it had remained within a narrow conception of the
judicial role, pronounced interrogation "inherently
compelling, " and then left law enforcement officials
to guess about what countermeasures would keep
police on the safe side of the constitutional line. As
Justice Rehnquist recognized, writing for the Court
in Michigan v. Tucker, the purpose of the warnings is
"to help police officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued risk that valuable evidence
[will] be lost."28
Why do Miranda's critics make such a fuss about
the warnings? If the suspect already knows his rights,
it can hardly hamper law enforcement for police to
reiterate them. At the heart of the problem is the suspect who does not know his rights, who believes that
the police are entitled to make him talk. But since
such a suspect thinks he is obliged to respond, his
answers are "compelled" in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege.
The crux of the matter is that the Justice Department wants to use statements compelled by the suspect's belief that he is obliged to answer. But this
objective contains the seeds of a dilemma. The
Department's report asserts that statements can be
induced by a mistaken sense of legal obligation without being "compelled." However, sensing that this is
analytical double-talk, the report also recognizes that
the absence of warnings will undermine the government's posture in litigation. So the report proposes an
alternative: a substitute warning would state that the
suspect need not make a statement, but that his
refusal to do so could be used against him in court.29
27 384 U.S. at 469-70.
28 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974) (emphasis added).
29 The proposed warning would read:
"You are not required to make a statement or to answer questions.
However, this interview does give you an opportunity to provide
any information that would show your innocence or explain your
actions. If you choose to remain silent, that fact may be disclosed
in court and may cast doubt on any story or explanation you give
later on." DOJ Report at 106 (cited in note 2).
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Will suspects who have difficulty grasping Miranda's relatively straightforward warnings understand
this convoluted message? Even sophisticated lawyers
will need more time than a suspect has to decide
whether or not this warning recognizes a right to
silence. In either event, a warning like this, far from
dispelling the interrogation pressures, can only
increase them. That is, of course, precisely what the
Justice Department wants to accomplish. But it is
also precisely what the fifth amendment prohibits.
IV.

DAMAGE TO LAw ENFORCEMENT?

The impetus for legitimating greater interrogation
pressure is presumably not mainly a desire for logically pure doctrinal analysis. Rather, the primary
concern is that Miranda'sground rules reduce police
effectiveness in solving crime and producing convictions. But the Justice Department's claims about
"damage to law enforcement" prove surprisingly
hollow.
Within weeks after Miranda was decided, reports
indicated that in many localities the flow of confessions continued unabated. Elsewhere declining confession rates were noted at first, but within a year or
two, both clearance and conviction rates were
thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels. Study
after study confirmed this trend. By the early 1970s,
well before the Supreme Court began trimming
Miranda, the view that Miranda posed no barrier to
effective law enforcement had become widely
accepted, not only by academics but also by such
prominent law enforcement officials as Los Angeles
District Attorney Evelle Younger and Kansas City
police chief (later FBI Director) Clarence Kelly. Justice Tom Clark, who filed an impassioned dissent in
Miranda, later confessed "error" in his "appraisal of
[its] effects upon the successful detection and prosecution of crime." 3 0 Chief Justice Burger, commenting
on his unwillingness to overrule Miranda, confirmed
this assessment when he wrote that "[tlhe meaning
of Miranda has become reasonably clear and
law enforcement practices have adjusted to its
strictures."'
ThAt Miranda has not produced dramatic effects on
law enforcement may be attributable to several
30 Tom C. Clark, Observations: Criminal Justice in America, 46
Tex. L. Rev. 742, 745 (1968).
31 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (concurring).
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causes. The result may be due in part to the willingness of some police officers to disregard the Miranda
requirements (in letter or spirit) and then to lie in
court about their performance. Miranda itself contained virtually no safeguards against this sort of
"adjustment" to the new rules. But many studies
have shown that the degree of compliance with
Miranda's requirements-especially in large, professionalized police departments-has been high.
Nonetheless, suspects agree to talk without the need
for pressure or deception (often because they think
they can talk their way out of trouble), and convictions are still obtained without confessions.
What evidence does the Justice Department offer
to counter this pervasive perception? The report's
discussion of "damage to law enforcement" makes
virtually no mention of extensive evidence to the contrary and relies instead on four empirical studies and
four specific cases. Three of the empirical studies
were conducted by the district attorneys of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Philadelphia during the weeks
immediately following Miranda, and they purport to
show sharp drops in the confession rate. But all three
studies are severely flawed. The data for preMiranda and post-Miranda periods were not compiled by comparable methods, and these studies offer
only crude guesses about the extent to which declining numbers of confessions (or "statements")
affected clearance and conviction rates. In any event,
these twenty-year-old studies are, at best, irrelevant
for assessing Miranda'scurrent impact because they
record its initial effects, before police had an opportunity to adjust interviewing methods and investigative practices to Miranda'srequirements.
The DOJ's fourth empirical source, a Pittsburgh
study, also focuses on the period immediately following Miranda, but it is somewhat more useful than the
Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Philadelphia studies
because its definitions and sampling methodologies
were consistent for the pre-Miranda and postMiranda periods. The DOJ report notes that the
Pittsburgh study found a 34 percent decline in the
confession rate. The report neglects to mention, however, that the Pittsburgh study found no significant
change in the clearance or conviction rates.32 Professor Richard Seeburger, co-author of the Pittsburgh
32 See Richard H. Seeburger and R. Stanton Wettick, Jr.,
Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1,
19,21, 23-24 (1967).
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study, emphatically denies that it provides support
for the Justice Department's claim of damage to law
enforcement.
The weakness of the Justice Department's empirical claims is paralleled by the surprisingly unpersuasive character of its specific case examples. Four
cases-from New York, Texas, California, and Arizona-were selected to document and dramatize
Miranda'snegative impact. The New York case deals
with a pre-Mirandaconfession excluded from a postMiranda trial. This purely transitional problem is at
best irrelevant to claims that Miranda currently has a
damaging impact. In fact the real lesson of the New
York case centers on the dangers of destabilizing
changes in the law, a lesson that argues for preserving Miranda, not for replacing it with a vague voluntariness requirement.
The DOJ's Texas and California examples are also
quite misleading. Both examples involve lower court
decisions that threw out murder confessions. But in
both instances the requirements invoked by the lower
courts were not ones mandated by Miranda or by
anything in the Supreme Court's related fifth amendment case law.
The last of the four cases, Edwards v. Arizona,"3 is
the most surprising entry on the Justice Department's
list. Edwards did involve a Miranda violation, and it
did lead to reversal of a conviction for a grisly murder. But the police error in Edwards was egregious.
The defendant, after invoking his right to counsel,
was returned to his cell. Detectives later sought to
interview him without counsel; when the defendant
refused, a guard told him that he "had to" and led
him unwillingly to the interview room. The Court's
opinion reversing the conviction was written by Justice White, the Court's most long-standing critic of
Miranda. Concurring opinions were authored by
Chief Justice Burger and by Justice Powell, who was
joined by Justice Rehnquist.
The Justice Department's invocation of Edwards
pointedly raises the problem of determining what
protections (if any) the Department would put in
Miranda's place. If the Justice Department agrees
that the Edwards confession would be excluded even
without Miranda, the case tells us nothing about the
impact of Mirandaitself. If the Department does not
agree, its position is unlikely to find favor with the
Rehnquist Court.
33451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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There is another surprising weakness in the
report's reliance on Edwards. Reading the DOJ
report, one would infer that the Court had turned
loose a brutal murderer; indeed the report makes no
mention of proceedings on remand. But there was a
retrial, Edwards' confession was excluded, and again
he was convicted of armed robbery, armed burglary,
and murder. Edwards was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to concurrent twelve to
thirty-five-year terms for the other two crimes. Even
if Miranda itself was the problem in Edwards,
Miranda itself simply made no difference.
In sum, the Justice Department's evidence of negative law enforcement impact, though heavily stressed
in its report, proves on inspection to be extraordinarily weak. The failure to turn up evidence of at least
some negative impact provides a striking demonstration of the paucity of such evidence and in effect
strongly reinforces the prevailing wisdom that
Miranda has not posed a significant barrier to effective police work.
There is an irony in these indications that Miranda
has not impaired law enforcement. If Miranda has
had little impact, why do civil libertarians get so
upset about talk of overruling it? The answer is that
procedure matters. The fifth amendment does not
protect individuals from conviction, but from a certain method of conviction, and the differences in
method are important. When the Supreme Court
ruled out physical abuse of suspects, the confession
rate may have slackened temporarily, but police soon
found other ways to get suspects to talk. When the
Supreme Court ruled out psychological intimidation,
the same process occurred. Now that police must follow Miranda's principles, they have found that they
can get statements without using compelling pressures or get convictions without using confessions at
all. For those concerned only with the "bottom line,"
Miranda may seem a mere symbol. But the symbolic
effects of criminal procedural guarantees are important; they underscore our societal commitment to
restraint in an area in which emotions easily run
uncontrolled.
V.

MIRANDA AS A COMPROMISE

The Miranda decision, of course, was a compromise. It did not eliminate all possibilities for abusive
interrogation, and it stopped far short of barring all
pressured or ill-considered waivers of fifth amend25

ment rights. It did nothing at all about police dominance of the inevitable swearing contest over actual
events in the interrogation room. Nevertheless, as
things have turned out, Miranda did accomplish
something, and it did so at surprisingly little cost.
Mirandareaffirms our constitutional commitment to
limited government; it provides a measure of reassurance to arrested suspects who may fear abuse; and by
reducing the permissible level of interrogation pressure, it gives suspects questioned in the stationhouse
at least some of the safeguards that we extend to suspects questioned in formal, public proceedings.
Whether Miranda represents the best possible
compromise is a different and more difficult question. Those who do not like Miranda's code-like
rules and would strip them from the opinion will be
left with the much more stringent principle that the
isolated suspect in custody cannot be questioned at
all. Those who would replace the Mirandacode with
a different set of procedures must be prepared to justify them not on the basis of law enforcement needs
but on the basis of the written constitutional mandate.
That inevitably will mean more rather than less protection for the suspect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For those who would remain faithful to the Constitution, the important question is not, "Which compromise?" Rather, it is the question why compromise
is justified at all. Undoubtedly there are times when
the self-incrimination clause is hard to live with.
(The recent months that our government spent hamstrung by the fifth amendment rights of Colonel
North and Admiral Poindexter were certainly among
these.) But the framers surely understood that the
fifth amendment would make law enforcement more
difficult. Unless one grants the Court a power to keep
the Constitution in tune with the times (in this case
our crime-ridden and crime-conscious times), claims
about damage to law enforcement are irrelevant to the
constitutional question. So even if the Miranda rules
pose serious problems (and they do not), the Court
cannot simply give the green light to police use of
compelling pressure. The Court cannot amend the
fifth amendment and should not be asked to do so.
From that perspective, the proper critique of
Mirandais not that it "handcuffs" the police but that
it does not go quite far enough. Miranda'ssafeguards
deserve to be strengthened, not overruled.
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